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The aimof this paper is to argue that a strictly reductionist approach to psychiatry represents
a theoretical and clinical obstacle to a fruitful synthesis between neurobiological and
sociocultural aspects of the sciences of mind. We examine the theoretical and practical
motivations underlying this approach, by analyzing the case of depressive disorders, as
deﬁned in the ﬁfth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM ), and the related removal of the “bereavement exclusion clause.” We ﬁrst explore
the claim thatDSM is atheoretical, observing that, far from being atheoretical, DSM adopts
an implicit, biologically inspired view of the mind; we show that such a view leads to a
sort of circularity in the deﬁnition of depressive disorders, in which psychopharmacology
seems to play a key role. We then turn to further problems deriving from this position,
analyzing the issue of placebo effects in the treatment of depressive disorders and the
philosophical question of normative preconditions for psychopathological diagnosis. Finally,
we address the issue of subjectivity, which, togetherwith the related aspect of the subject’s
relational context, appears to be crucial to any scientiﬁc theorizing about mental disorders,
despite DSM ’s attempt to exclude it. Our defense of a non-reductionist view of mental
disorders, however, does not imply that we endorse any sort of metaphysical dualism, or
anti-diagnostic or anti-psychiatric positions. On the contrary, we argue that the adoption of a
reductionist position actually undermines the theoretical and clinical accuracy in explaining
depressive disorders.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the landscape of psychiatry1 has
changed dramatically: impressive developments within neuropsy-
chology have fuelled an explosion of interest in the biological bases
of mindedness (Andreasen, 1984, 2001; White et al., 2012; Walter,
2013), often leading the subjective, relational, and contextual fac-
tors inﬂuencing normal and abnormal behavior to be overlooked.
Despite claims about the social and discursive dimensions of
mind and personhood, particularly those informed by social con-
structionism (Harré, 1998; Borch-Jacobsen, 2009; Gergen, 2009),
biologically inspired views seem to currently prevail, at least in
relation to the explanation of mental disorders. In this paper, we
examine the theoretical and practical motivations underlying this
predominance, by analyzing the case of depressive disorders as
depicted in theAmerican PsychiatricAssociation’s (APA) Diagnos-
tic and StatisticalManual of Mental Disorders (DSM). In particular,
we take the deﬁnition of major depressive disorder (MDD) and the
related omissionof the“bereavement exclusion clause”as instances
of a more general view informing the approach brought to bear
1DSM has acquired over time an increasing relevance, up to the current status of
“Bible of psychiatry”(Maj, 2014). Given this status, its relevance has had a signiﬁcant
impact also on the work of other ﬁgures in the ﬁeld of mental health, such as
for instance clinical psychologists and counselors, who both in their clinical and
research activity refer to DSM and to its diagnostic categories, and even for judges
and lawyers, due to the wide and long-established use of DSM in criminology and
forensic psychiatry.
in DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013a). We
claim that DSM system implicitly assumes in the case of MDD a
reductionist stance and that such a position is likely to represent a
serious clinical and theoretical obstacle to developing a “modern
synthesis” within the sciences of mind.
As is well known in the philosophy of science, the term reduc-
tionism may have different meanings according to what exactly is
held to be reduced: we may be reductionist in trying to reduce
either the language of a theory T to the language of a reducing
theory T′, or the laws of T to the laws of T′, or the basic entities
described by T to those described by T′ (see the review in van
Riel and van Gulick, 2014). Although there is no rigorous, univer-
sally accepted theory of reduction, in this paper, we will refer to a
“reductionist approach” as an approach that tends in principle to
reduce psychological and psychopathological phenomena to their
neurobiological correlates.
We attempt to show that despite its allegedly descriptive and
atheoretical standpoint, the DSM, as currently formulated, implic-
itly relies on a strongly individualistic viewof depression and,more
generally, of a range of mental disorders: it supports an unwar-
ranted view of the “mind” and the “human being” as essentially
reducible to their neurophysiological bases, at the expense of fail-
ing to take into account the relational, social, and cultural factors
inﬂuencing mental suffering.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we examine the claim
that DSM is atheoretical. In this regard, we emphasize that, far
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from being atheoretical, DSM adopts an implicit, biologically
inspired view of the mind, and we suggest that such a view leads
to a sort of circularity in the deﬁnition of depressive disorders,
in which psychopharmacology seems to play a key role. We also
address the problem of reliability vs. validity in the diagnostic
process; this issue has been raised by the major critics of the cur-
rent DSM edition as a systematic whole, strictly linked to the
importance of taking into due account the subjective and con-
textual factors for diagnosing depressive disorders. We then turn
to further problems deriving from an atheoretical position, dis-
cussing the issue of placebo effects in the treatment of depressive
disorders and the philosophical question of normative precondi-
tions for psychopathological diagnosis. Finally we return to the
issue of subjectivity, which, together with the related issue of the
subject’s relational context, appears to be crucial to any scien-
tiﬁc theorizing about mental disorders, despite DSM ’s attempt to
exclude it. As we hope to make clear, however, defending a non-
reductionist viewof mental disorders need not imply endorsement
of any kind of metaphysical dualism, or of anti-diagnostic or anti-
psychiatric positions. On the contrary, we argue that the adoption
of a reductionist position actually undermines the very accu-
racy in explaining depressive disorders in theoretical and clinical
terms.
It must be clearly emphasized that our critical remarks are
focused on a speciﬁc disorder (MDD). This critical stance need
not imply a dismissive attitude toward thewhole diagnostic system
proposed in the manual: MDD formulation by DSM-5 is espe-
cially wanting from our point of view, but we acknowledge that
in several other respects and with reference to other pathologies
(i.e., neurocognitive disorders and personality disorders) DSM-5
may be seen as a signiﬁcant advancement (Migone, 2013; Maj,
2014).
DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS FROM THE ATHEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVE OF DSM
The publication of DSM ’s ﬁfth edition in 2013 was preceded, and
is still accompanied, by strong debate, both within the scientiﬁc
community and in the media (Wakeﬁeld, 2010; Angell, 2011a,b;
Spitzer, 2011; Frances, 2013; Insel, 2013). The issue at stake is that
DSM-5 may lead to the increasingly widespread “medicalization”
of psychology. It is suggested that – also due to its impact via the
socialmedia –DSM-5 is likely to turn into a true“social representa-
tion” (Moscovici et al., 2001) with the power to strongly inﬂuence
clinical practice, pushing it in the direction of the large-scale pre-
scription of drugs. Notably, among the most distinguished critical
voices taking part in this debate, we ﬁnd Robert Spitzer and Allen
Frances, the editors of DSM-III (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion [APA], 1980) andDSM-IV (American PsychiatricAssociation
[APA], 1994), respectively.
One of the most signiﬁcant and controversial changes in the
new edition of DSM is its dropping of the “bereavement exclu-
sion clause,” that is to say, its omission of the last bulwark still
present in DSM-IV that had allowed a distinction to be drawn
between depression and normal sadness (Horwitz and Wakeﬁeld,
2007; Horwitz, 2011; Wakeﬁeld and First, 2012; Wakeﬁeld and
Schmitz, 2012). This clause prevented people who had experi-
enced the loss of a loved one in the two months prior to the onset
of symptoms from being diagnosed with MDD. Frances (2013),
head of the DSM-IV task force, regretfully observes that dropping
the bereavement exclusion clausemeans confusingmourningwith
melancholia:
“DSM-5 has made it easier to diagnose MDD among the bereaved,
even in the ﬁrst weeks after their loss. This was a stubbornly misguided
decision in the face of universal opposition fromclinicians, professional
associations and journals, the press and 100s of 1000s of grievers from
all around the world” (Frances, 2013, p. 103).
In DSM-5 bereavement comes to be considered “a severe psy-
chosocial stressor,” which only represents an “additional risk”
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013b) for the outset
of depressive disorders in people already constitutionally inclined
toward depression. The removal from DSM-5 of the bereavement
exclusion clause seems to be the logical outcome of a process initi-
atedmany years earlierwith the publicationof DSM-III (American
PsychiatricAssociation [APA], 1980). In this sectionwe try to illus-
trate some of the assumptions that have produced this outcome. It
is not our intention to retrace here the complex history of depres-
sion inWestern culture and the intricate taxonomic issues that have
arisen over time andwhich are also reﬂected in the various editions
of the DSM (for a detailed account see: Ehrenberg, 1998; Shorter,
2009, 2013). We shall only refer to a general and widely accepted
distinction concerning the origin of depressive symptoms: the tra-
ditional dichotomybetween“endogenous”depression (once called
melancholia), that is to say, biologically based depression arising
in the absence of any apparent external reason on the one hand,
and reactive depression, that is, a depression triggered by negative
external circumstances on the other (Pignarre, 2001). This distinc-
tion, which informed the history of psychopathology for centuries
and still seems meaningful to the extent that it retains its status as
a Western common sense belief, ﬁrst lost support and ultimately
was totally abandoned by contemporary psychiatry. The outcome
has been the “triumph of major depression.” “Continuing this
tradition seemed relatively straightforward, but instead the tradi-
tion derailed and the two depressions became collapsed into one”
(Shorter, 2009, p. 158). DSM-III appears to have represented a
sort of point of no return in the direction of the demise of this
traditional distinction.
“[. . .] When DSM-III launched ‘major depression’ in 1980, psychia-
trists found themselves quite without defense. Many sensed that there
was a big problem in conﬂating endogenous depression and reactive
unhappiness: we were told that breaking up with your boyfriend was
on a par with lying curled into fetal, melancholic ball. Both could be
major depression as long as the“Chinesemenu”of criteriawas satisﬁed”
(Shorter, 2013, p. 195).
How did this come about? The main reason was that starting
from its third edition, DSM has been presented as an atheoretical
and solely descriptive tool, that is to say, as independent of any
particular psychological or psychiatric theory. This decision was
justiﬁed by Spitzer, who headed up the DSM-III task force, on
the basis of the reasonable practical need to formulate a com-
mon language for the scientiﬁc community, which up to that
time had been divided into different factions to such an extent
that it was virtually impossible to obtain diagnostic agreement on
given patients among clinicians from different theoretical schools.
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Hence the decision to deﬁne and categorize the different mental
disorders solely on the basis of descriptive symptoms, without
attributing them to any (set of) causes, whether internal or exter-
nal, because this would imply a speciﬁc theoretical system. This
DSM symptom-based perspective has also allowed mental dis-
orders to be deﬁned as clinically signiﬁcant symptoms reﬂecting
dysfunction inside the individual (Wakeﬁeld, 1992), without tak-
ing into account the life events and social context in which the
onset of symptoms takes place2.
In the case of depressive disorders, this new approach meant
that there were no longer any grounds for the distinction between
neurotic and psychotic depression, a distinction that relied on
a psychoanalytic framework (Shorter, 2009, 2013); even more
importantly, it was no longer possible to draw the more gen-
eral distinction between endogenous and reactive depression,
and therefore a wide and heterogeneous range of disorders that
manifested with similar symptoms were placed under the same
diagnostic category of MDD. For a diagnosis of MDD, an indi-
vidual must present – on a close to daily basis – ﬁve of the
following nine symptoms for a period of at least 2 weeks: (1)
depressed mood; (2) anhedonia, that is to say, diminished interest
in usually pleasant activities; (3) weight gain or loss or change in
appetite; (4) insomnia or hypersomnia (excessive sleep); (5) psy-
chomotor agitation or retardation; (6) fatigue or loss of energy;
(7) feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt;
(8) diminished ability to think or concentrate or indecisiveness;
(9) recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation or suicide
attempt. A diagnosis of MDD also requires the ﬁve symptoms to
include either depressed mood or diminished interest or pleasure
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1980, 2013a). Accord-
ing to Horwitz and Wakeﬁeld (2007), the problem with this kind
of deﬁnition is that the mere presence of a particular group of
symptoms is sufﬁcient to diagnose the presence of a depressive
disorder.
In DSM-IV, the grief experienced after the death of a loved one
was considered distinct from other cases, because the same group
of symptoms was viewed as representing a physiological reaction
to a highly stressful negative event.
“Yet symptoms such as depressed mood, loss of interest in usual activ-
ities, insomnia, lessened appetite, inability to concentrate, and so on
might naturally occur for a period of 2 weeks in the absence of any
disorder after any of a wide range of negative events, such as betrayal
by romantic partners, being passed over for an anticipated promotion,
failing amajor test that has serious implications for one’s career, discov-
ering a life-threatening illness in oneself or in a loved one, or enduring
the humiliation that follows revelations of disgraceful behavior. Such
reactions, even when quite intense due to the severity of the experience,
are surely part of normal human nature. Just as it is obvious why the
DSM excludes bereavement from diagnosis, by parity of reasoning it
seems obvious that it should also exclude these other sort of reactions
to negative circumstances. The diagnosis, however, does not exclude
such non-grief responses. Because of the symptom-based nature of the
2It is interesting to recall that in the ﬁrst edition of DSM (American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 1952), mental disorders were deﬁned in terms of reactions
(schizophrenic, neurotic, depressive. . .), a deﬁnition which presupposed the exis-
tence of “external” factors causing mental suffering to the individuals (Greenberg,
2010).
criteria, any sadness response involving enough of the speciﬁed symp-
toms for at least 2 weeks will be misclassiﬁed as a disorder, along with
genuine psychiatric disturbances” (Horwitz and Wakeﬁeld, 2007, p. 9).
Thus, given that taking a person’s life events and social con-
text into account in the diagnostic process may turn out to
be too complex, modern DSM-informed psychiatry accepts the
hypothesis that a diagnosis of major depression may be formu-
lated on the basis of symptoms alone: in practice, the mere
presence of ﬁve out of the nine depressive symptoms indicates
that a particular individual, regardless of his/her life events
and the meaning (s)he attributes to them, suffers from depres-
sion and as a consequence may be treated with antidepressant
drugs. This approach is likely to result in the frequent misla-
beling of normal sorrow (arising in response to negative events
in a person’s life) as depressive disorder and, indeed, the last
20 years have seen an explosion in the US of ﬂawed diagnoses
of depressive disorders requiring pharmacological treatment, a
pandemic largely driven by marketing pressures orchestrated
by Big Pharma (Angell, 2004; Horwitz and Wakeﬁeld, 2007;
Herzberg, 2009; Hirshbein, 2009; Greenberg, 2010). Although
remaining “cautious about the possibility of incorporating con-
text into diagnostic criteria and about the unreliability and false
negatives that might result.” Spitzer (2007, pp. 8–9) himself
has recognized this limitation of DSM : “. . . its criteria speciﬁed
the symptoms that must be present to justify a given diagnosis
but ignored any reference to the context in which they devel-
oped. In doing so, they allowed normal responses to stressors
to be characterized as symptoms of disorder”. All these issues –
he concluded – should be seriously considered as part of the
agenda for DSM-5.
Despite the caveats coming from Spitzer, Frances, and many
other eminent authors (see for instance Goldberg et al., 2010),
the paradoxical decision ﬁnally made by the DSM-5 task force
was – instead of broadening the range of negative triggering
events – to also expunge bereavement as a criterion for discrim-
inating between normal and pathological depressive symptoms,
relegating to a footnote the criteria for distinguishing depression
from bereavement. This footnote, proposed by a European psychi-
atrist (Maj, 2014), speciﬁes a number of clinical indicators such as
a feeling of emptiness and loss alongside a preserved normal level
of self-esteem in physiological grief versus anhedonia and a sense
of self-disgust in depression, as well as recommending that clinical
assessment take the patient’s overall personal history and cultural
context into due account.
At this point, it is interesting to analyze the arguments used by
the DSM-5 task force to justify their omission of the bereavement
exclusion clause (AmericanPsychiatricAssociation [APA],2013b).
Theﬁrst argument concerns the fact that the periodof 2months
following the loss of a loved one was arbitrary, given that “both
physicians and grief counselors recognize that the duration is
more commonly 1–2 years” (p. 5). The alleged “logical” conse-
quence was that – in order to avoid any arbitrariness regarding
duration – no time period should be indicated for normal griev-
ing; thus, a person who has lost a loved one may potentially be
diagnosed with clinical depression starting from the day of the
funeral.
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The second argument recognizes bereavement “as a severe
psychosocial stressor that can precipitate a major depressive
episode in a vulnerable individual” (p. 5, italics added). The
concept of “vulnerability” is introduced as the basis for distin-
guishing between normal “physiological” sorrow over the loss
of a loved one and a case of major depression. But, how
is it possible to differentiate between these two kinds of suf-
fering on the basis of symptomatic-behavioral criteria alone?
Similar behaviors are observed in both cases, as the DSM-5
editors seem to have acknowledged by dropping the bereave-
ment exclusion clause. Even more importantly, “vulnerability”
– like the opposite quality of “resilience” (Walsh, 2006) – is not
an observable “fact”: it far more closely resembles a theoreti-
cal construct. But what kind of theory would underpin such a
construct?
The third argument put forward helps to clarify this:
“Bereavement-related major depression is most likely to occur
in individuals with past personal and family histories of major
depressive episodes. It is genetically inﬂuenced” (ibidem, italics
added). The kind of vulnerability involved here seems to be
“genetic,” and identiﬁable on the basis of “family histories” of
major depressive episodes. Even if we leave aside the problem-
atic nature of assessing in the “here and now,” on the strict basis of
DSM symptomatic criteria, major depressive episodes in patient’s
family members that may have taken place in the distant past,
the only familial factors referred to here appear to be genetic
ones: family histories of MDDs are merely considered in terms of
their genetic inﬂuence on depressed individuals. However, family
therapy and constructivist traditions might offer a very different
view of shared family histories, for instance in terms of members
taking part in the same family relational games (Selvini Palaz-
zoli et al., 1989), family narratives (White and Epston, 1991), or
family semantic constructs (Procter, 1996; Linares, 2010; Ugazio,
2013).
The fourth and ﬁnal argument is highly signiﬁcant for the
line of reasoning that we go on to develop in this paper: “The
depressive symptoms associated with bereavement-related depres-
sion respond to the same psychosocial and medication treatments as
non-bereavement-related depression” (ibidem, italics added). The
atheoretical and symptom-based nature of DSM-5 allows different
kinds of depression to be put together in the same category, because
they may be effectively treated using the same remedies, particularly
medication.
We would stress that while the ﬁrst argument seems to be a
matter of which convention to apply in relation to the duration
of grief, the last three are based on an implicit assumption that is
reductionist in nature, namely the assumption that concepts such
as“vulnerability,”“familiarity”and the likemay be reduced to their
biological counterparts.
Thus, DSM-V reaches the conclusion that “evidence does not
support the separation of loss of a loved one from other stres-
sors in terms of its likelihood of precipitating a major depressive
episode or the relative likelihood that the symptoms will remit
spontaneously” (ibidem, italics added). What kind of “evidence”
are we talking about here? In addressing this issue, let us sharpen
our analysis of DSM ’s atheoretical approach by focusing on two
more general aspects.
The ﬁrst aspect regards the difference between reliability and
validity. Reliability refers to the degree towhich a diagnostic system
such as DSM allows two (or more) clinicians to independently
agree on the diagnosis of a particular case, attributing it to the
same category. Validity (or more appropriately construct validity)
is the power of a given diagnostic category to actually repre-
sent and measure the phenomenon (i.e., the construct) it was
designed for. Now, it is commonly held that DSM has addressed
the need for reliability, which, as mentioned above, was a key
unresolved issue prior to DSM-III, whose adoption meant that
clinicians from different theoretical traditions could ﬁnally avail
of a tool and a common “factual-symptomatic” language with
which to compare and discuss their clinical assessments. On the
contrary, however, DSM has been unable to offer robust con-
struct validity for its own categorization of mental disorder. Such
a ﬂaw is not surprising if we consider the merely descriptive nature
of the system, given that construct validity necessarily implies
some kind of theory or model of the phenomenon to be stud-
ied that an atheoretical approach by deﬁnition cannot provide.
Frances (2013) points out how difﬁcult it is to ﬁnd a balance
between reliability and validity: the former imposes simplicity
in order to make generalizations across all people suffering from
a particular disorder; the latter tends to be subtle, complex, and
inferential with a view to capturing clinical differences among
individuals.
“If the criteria set includes items that are inferential or complicated,
different clinicians will disagree on whether or not they are present.
Worshipping at the temple of reliability, the DSM criteria sets are as
simple as they can be – a catalog only of what is the most surface
and common in mental disorders. This was a necessary choice, but it
necessarily compromises validity-constraining ourselves to the simple
blinds us to subtlety, nuance, and individual variability” (Frances, 2013,
p. 23).
This is an inconsistency which is both theoretical and clinical:
some of the main depressive symptoms are found not only in the
case of bereavement or other negative events, but also in other
forms of psychopathology (See Ugazio, 2013, p. 228).
“Thus the recent focus in psychiatry on reliability of diagnosis based on
symptoms has been pursued at some cost to validity – that is, whether
the diagnosis represents a correct attribution of disorder. The DSM ’s
criteria for MDD are one instance in which increased reliability has had
the inadvertent side effect of creating substantial newvalidity problems”
(Horwitz and Wakeﬁeld, 2007, p. 8).
The second aspect is, in a sense, more radical because it is of a
philosophical nature: is it really possible to be atheoretical? One of
the major conclusions from the philosophical analysis of science
after the demise of logical empiricism in the second half of the
20th century has been that there is no such thing as notions of
“experience,”“fact,”“evidence” and the like which are not theoreti-
cally informed. In the wake of the tradition begun by philosophers
and historians of science such as Hanson and Kuhn, a common-
place of contemporary philosophy of science is that any piece of
scientiﬁcally relevant ‘evidence’ is in fact theory-laden (Hanson,
1958), that is to say it is meaningful only when viewed as part of a
theoretical framework – which Kuhn calls a paradigm – implicitly
assumed by the scientist in order to make sense of phenomena
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(Kuhn, 1962/19702). In the words of the philosopher of science
Peter Godfrey-Smith,
“[. . .] a paradigm is a whole way of doing science, in some particular
ﬁeld. It is a package of claims about the world, methods for gathering
and analyzing data, and habits of scientiﬁc thought and action. In
Kuhn’s theory of science, the big changes in how scientists see the world
– the ‘revolutions’ that science undergoes every now and then – occur
when one paradigm replaces another. Kuhn argued that observational
data and logic alone cannot force scientists to move from one paradigm to
another, because different paradigms often include within them different
rules for treating data and assessing theories” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.
76).
Furthermore, mainly on the basis of Quine (1953) work in
epistemology and the philosophy of language, contemporary phi-
losophy of science questions the very possibility of drawing a
sharp distinction in principle between purely “factual” statements,
directly indicating “pure” experience, and “theoretical” statements
(Quine, 1953: for a review of Quinean philosophy, see Hyl-
ton, 2014). In this sense, the “selectivity” of DSM ’s atheoretical
approach – which implicitly seems to draw a vague distinc-
tion between “abstract” and “factual” theories (whereby the latter
resemble mere “facts” or “states of affairs”) – also appears to be
ill-founded from a solely epistemological point of view.
DSM ’s NEUROBIOLOGICAL VIEW AND THE ISSUE OF
“CIRCULARITY” IN THE DEFINITION OF DEPRESSIVE
DISORDERS
It is widely recognized that the history of modern psychiatry has
been profoundly inﬂuenced by the discovery and diffusion of
drugs, particularly antidepressants (Kirsch, 2009; Shorter, 2009,
2013; Greenberg, 2010). In addition to the economic relation-
ships between academic psychiatry and pharmaceutical producers,
which many scholars and opinion leaders have condemned as one
of the main reasons behind the contemporary depression pan-
demic affecting Western societies3 (Breggin and Breggin, 1994;
Angell, 2004, 2011a,b; Cosgrove et al., 2006; Herzberg, 2009;
Greenberg, 2010), the advent of psychopharmaceuticals has also
played a crucial “epistemic” role in the theoretical deﬁnition of
depression (Ehrenberg, 1998; Pignarre, 2001). The criterion of
efﬁcacy of the same medication in treating depressive symptoms
regardless of context was one of the arguments on the basis
of which the DSM-5 editors decided to drop the bereavement
exclusion clause. The effectiveness of a given type of drug (typi-
cally Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, SSRI) on depressive
symptoms is often taken as an established matter of fact, in
terms of the observable effect of certain molecules on human
behavior, and not as a theoretical hypothesis still awaiting full
empirical support. The theory that a chemical imbalance in the
brain causes depression seems to be widely accepted (Kirsch,
2009; Shorter, 2009, 2013). We will come back later to the
3It should be pointed out here that the US is one of the few countries in which
advertising directly targeted at the consumer has been legalized and that “ofﬁcial”
DSM diagnoses are required for insurance companies to refund the cost of treat-
ment. Frances (2013), who was in charge of the DSM-IV task force, expresses a sort
of mea culpa for failing to predict the pharmacological abuse that came about in this
situation and for failing to formulate stricter criteria for the diagnosis of depression
and other mental disorders (such as ADHD, social phobia, autism, and so on).
weak points of such a theory, focusing for now on the epis-
temic role of the effectiveness of antidepressants, that is, the role
played by drugs in deﬁning the “validity” of the construct of
“depression.”
First of all, it is important to note that, despite enthusi-
astic claims about advancements in neurobiological psychiatry,
unfortunately no reliable biological markers have been found so
far for the majority of mental illnesses, including depression.
Nonetheless, recent neuroscientiﬁc discoveries about brain func-
tioning obtained through neuro-imaging techniques (Legrenzi
and Umiltà, 2012) are often taken as evidence justifying an almost
exclusively neurobiological approach to the explanation of the
mental realm. In describing the excessive ambitions associated
with DSM-5, Frances (2013) writes:
“First was the unrealistic goal of transforming psychiatric diagnosis by
somehow basing it on the exciting ﬁndings of neuroscience. This would
bewonderfulwere it possible, but the effort failed for the obvious reason
that it is still a bridge too far” (Frances, 2013, pp. 95–96).
Dowrick (2009), in reviewing the ﬁndings of the scientiﬁc
literature on the biological basis of depression, adds:
“It would greatly assist the cause of those who see depression as dis-
crete category or a disease entity if it could be demonstrated that it does
have a unique and speciﬁc biological basis. Although psychiatrists such
as Andreasen (2001) write as if such a basis has already been demon-
strated, in reality this is far from the case. The search for a clear genetic
explanation of depression – the holy grail of biomedical sciences and
the pharmaceutical industry – has been extensive, arduous, and well-
funded, but the results of this quest have not justiﬁed the enormous
effort or expenditure” (p. 70).
This lack of evidence, though typical not only of psychiatry
but also of many other branches of medicine (Maj, 2014), seems
to be particularly signiﬁcant for psychiatry. Together with the
assumption that drugs effectively treat depressive symptoms on
the one hand, and the DSM symptom-based criteria for depres-
sion on the other, it gives rise to a sort of “circular deﬁnition”: we
label as depression the set of disorders whose symptoms are sen-
sitive to the therapeutic action of antidepressants. In the absence
of both a clear general deﬁnition of “mental disorders” (Wake-
ﬁeld, 1992; Frances, 2013; Maj, 2014) and of undisputed criteria
for separating normal and abnormal depression, the drug efﬁ-
cacy criterion seems to have offered an easy way out. Pignarre
(2001) describes such an approach as “small biology,” as opposed
to “great biology,” which can provide solid proof of the causes
of (organic) illness and has clear biologic markers at its disposal.
Due to the fact that pharmaceuticals seem to act effectively on
depressive symptoms although the causes of the disorder are still
unknown, the drugs play a crucial role in the identiﬁcation of the
disorder itself. This deﬁnition is not represented by a set of neces-
sary and sufﬁcient conditions explaining the onset of depression,
but by positive responses to drugs – in terms of symptomatic
remission.
From such a perspective, the distinction between endogenous
and reactive depression becomes useless: because antidepressants
display similar efﬁcacy in both cases, the traditional distinction
may be abandoned, including in the case of bereavement. Psy-
chopharmaceuticals, given their essentially symptomatic effects,
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are “practical” in nature, that is to say they are “atheoretical,” con-
sistently with the DSM framework. In order to endow them with
theoretical status, it is necessary to come down on the side of the
“biological option” as fully explaining mental disorders:
“The major psychiatric illnesses are diseases . . . caused principally by
biological factors, and most of these factors reside in the brain . . . As
a scientiﬁc discipline, psychiatry seeks to identify the biological factors
that cause the mental illness. This model assumes that each different
type of illness has a different speciﬁc cause” (Andreasen, 1984, pp.
29–30).
Although this view still seems somewhat of a gamble, it has
determined the success of medication-based treatment at the
expense of other kinds of psychotherapeutic treatments such as
family therapy, which search for contextual causes and reme-
dies for (at least some kinds of) reactive depression (Pignarre,
2001).
Furthermore, it should be noted that DSM diagnostic cate-
gories were designed not only for clinical practice, but also for
research purposes. The groups of homogeneous subjects suffering
from a certain mental disorder who are eligible to take part in
controlled studies within psychiatry are constructed on the basis
of DSM categories. These subjects are often tested in terms of
their reaction to different kind of treatments, especially drugs.
But if, as we have argued, sensitivity to drug effects is part of
the deﬁnition of the diagnostic categories, research designs too
are likely to be compromised by a circular and self-conﬁrming
perspective.
Let us now turn to the controversial issue of drug effective-
ness, from which the theory of chemical imbalance in depression
derived most of its empirical support. It cannot be excluded that
the effectiveness of treatment with medication might be due not
only to the drug’s active principle, but also to other factors, such as
spontaneous remission or a placebo effect. Kirsch (2009), whose
initial research interest was the placebo mechanism, has seriously
challenged what he calls the “myth” of the effectiveness of antide-
pressants. After conducting a meta-analysis of published studies
conducted in this ﬁeld, he also examined unpublished literature,
requesting permission from the FDA (Food and Drug Adminis-
tration) to access “secret” databases. Kirsch’s (2009) conclusions
were astonishing: antidepressants work mainly on the bases of
placebo effect. In particular, he found no signiﬁcant difference
between SSRI effects and placebos for light and moderate depres-
sion, while in the case of more serious depression the drug effect
size was small. Moreover, psychotherapy seems to perform slightly
better than drugs in terms of recovery (also at follow-up tests),
while patients who received no treatment showed a signiﬁcantly
lower level of improvement than those who received any type of
treatment (drug, psychotherapy, and placebo, respectively). In
addition, when active placebos (i.e., inert substances with side
effects) were used, there was no difference at all in the effects
of antidepressants and placebos, a ﬁnding suggesting that the
patients in double-blind randomized studies were able to guess
which group they had been assigned to (drug vs. placebo) on the
basis of whether or not they experienced side effects. Kirsch also
compared studies using different drugs and found contradictory
outcomes: depressive symptoms seem to be inﬂuenced in a sim-
ilar way by medications that, respectively, increase and decrease
serotonin levels; while drugs that have no impact at all on sero-
tonin also seem to be effective4. These ﬁndings seriously question
the widely accepted theory that antidepressants are effective, as
well as the related theory that depression is explained by chemical
imbalance in the brain. Kirsch draws a drastic conclusion in this
regard: the account of depression as a chemical imbalance in the
brain is simply wrong. Even if we do not wish to be so drastic,
we are bound to conclude that there are many open questions in
relation to the efﬁcacy of antidepressants.
Studies conducted on non-human primates (McGuire et al.,
1983; Raleigh et al., 1984; Sapolsky, 2005) suggest that serotonin
levels vary as a function of primates’ social status. When dominant
males were removed from their high-level hierarchical position in
the group, they appeared to manifest “depressed”behaviors, refus-
ing food, and engaging in a diminished level of activity; at the same
time their serotonin levels rapidly decreased. On the contrary,
those who replaced the dethroned males in superior positions
displayed an enhanced level of activity, along with an increase
in serotonin levels. Therefore, although depression in primates
appears to be correlated to low levels of serotonin, the etiolog-
ical theory of serotonin deﬁciency seems not to play the main
role in explaining depression: “elevated blood serotonin concen-
tration is a state-dependent consequence of active occupation of the
dominant male social position, and we believe that a reinterpre-
tation of the signiﬁcance of hyperserotonemia in humans may be
warranted” (Raleigh et al., 1984, p. 405).
THE NORMATIVE NATURE OF PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS
Our analysis so far seriously questions the validity of both the epis-
temic value of the (a)theoretical DSM symptom-based deﬁnition
of depressive disorders and the empirical validation of drug efﬁ-
cacy for their treatment. But even if, for the sake of argument, we
were to leave these issues aside, another problem arises, namely
the normative nature of both diagnoses and treatments in psychi-
atry (Stier, 2013). In general terms the status of normativity is
an especially thorny issue, particularly against the contemporary
background of naturalism (see De Caro and MacArthur, 2004;
Laudisa, 2014 for a recent assessment of naturalism), currently by
and large the prevailing approach to scientiﬁc knowledge. Assum-
ing that our lives depend to a large extent on normative entities
and issues, as well as on a biological, chemical, and physical struc-
ture, how do normative entities relate to the natural order? And
do they really exist, or are they reducible after all to natural enti-
ties or processes? (See De Caro and MacArthur, 2010 for a recent
assessment of normativity in relation to naturalism).
One of several instances of how normativity is relevant to our
discussion concerns the notion of normality. Signiﬁcantly Frances
(2013) gave his book on DSM-5 the title Saving Normal, devoting
the entire ﬁrst chapter to discussing “what’s normal and what’s
not.” Now it is clear that this sort of analysis – far from being
‘factual’ – presupposes a reference to values and culturally negoti-
ated standards, according to which a researcher formulates a true
theory of “normal” and “(psycho)-pathological” phenomena that
4According to Kirsch (2009) such conclusions hold not only for serotonin, but
also for the other neurotransmitters that are usually considered to be implicated in
depression.
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is highly normative in nature: in order to distinguish between nor-
mal and abnormal conditions, one cannot avoid assuming – at
least tentatively – a notion of what “normality” means in a given
social context, and no “fact” per se can provide such a notion.
“It would not be very shocking to claim that, e.g., neuroscientists have
to use normative concepts such as the ‘correct functioning’ of certain
brain areas. Nearly everything in the world – including psychiatry –
is normative in this sense. A much more provocative claim is that
psychiatry is guided by social, moral, cultural, and other norms. If this
is true, and if it is also true that these kinds of norms are relative to
time and place, then psychiatry cannot claim to know what a mental
disease is ‘in itself ’, where normality ends and mental disorder begins”
(Stier, 2013, p. 2–3).
Something similar holds for the notion of efﬁcacy, of which we
can hardly make sense on the basis of merely factual or descriptive
criteria. To say that a drug is “effective” means that it makes the
patients feel better. If we wish to preserve their “heuristic” use-
fulness, at both the theoretical and practical clinical levels, we are
forced to recognize that both the “normal–abnormal” continuum
and the notion of “feeling better” are normative constructs that
are not reducible to merely biological data. As Stier (2013) argues:
“whether something is a mental disease can only be determined on the
mental level. This is so because we can only call behavior deviant by
comparing it to non-deviant behavior, i.e., by using norms regarding
behavior. Second, from this it follows that psychiatric disorders cannot
be completely reduced to the physical level even if mental processes and
states as such might be completely reducible to brain functions” (p. 1).
Moreover, with speciﬁc reference to depression for instance,
what role is the concrete, lived experience of depression supposed
to play in enriching the interpretive explanatory frameworkwithin
which the pathology is located? It turns out to be plausible to
claim that, in this regard, a crucial role is played by the patient’s
own assessment of the relationship between self and the world:
in “depressive” situations (Jacobs, 2013) patients fail to locate
themselves in the world around them.
“Depressed persons often report that they feel disconnected from the
world, that it appears as an empty place deprived of all meaning, that
other people and activities formerly enjoyed are no longer of inter-
est, that they get stuck in deliberative processes of rumination and
indecisiveness, etc.” (Jacobs, 2013, p. 2).
If what is at stake here is making a meaningful connection
with the world, it is far from surprising that such a highly eval-
uative and normative operation as that of attributing meaning
to the relationship between oneself and the world eludes any
biologically inspired, non-normative approach to psychopathol-
ogy. However, any attempt to reduce the normative level to the
empirical/biological level risks causing a signiﬁcant loss in the
analytical power of diagnostic categories (and consequently in the
choice of clinical treatments). At a more general level, it means
impoverishing the understanding, description, and explanation of
mindedness.
THE LOSS OF SUBJECTIVITY AND INTERPERSONAL
CONTEXT
As stated above, DSM justiﬁes its atheoretical perspective on
the reasonable grounds that there is a need to pursue greater
reliability of psychiatric diagnosis. In the case of depressive dis-
orders this reliability has not proved to be so robust in either
theoretical or clinical terms. Furthermore, validity issues seem
to be unsolvable using an atheoretical approach. The problems
in both of these areas appear to be connected to the cutting
out of subjectivity and interpersonal context from the diagnostic
process.
“A great deal is lost in the translation between the rich diversity of dif-
ferent individual experiences of depression and the bland ﬁve-of-nine
criteria set chosen to deﬁne it. In describing the characteristics shared
by those who meet the criteria for a given mental disorder, the DSM
deﬁnitions must obscure the way they are individual and different.
DSM deﬁnitions do not include personal and contextual factors, such
as whether the depressive symptoms are an understandable response
to a loss, a terrible life situation, psychological conﬂict, or personality
factors” (Frances, 2013, p. 23).
The problem of subjectivity is well known to be one of the
most thorny issues in the entire ﬁeld of the sciences of mind.
Not surprisingly the DSM symptom-based approach, inspired by
evidence-basedmedicine (Pignarre,2001; Shorter,2009), attempts
to objectify psychiatric mental disorders: in this view, subjectivity
is a disturbance factor to be eliminated in order to purify scientiﬁc
analysis of mental disorders. In particular, twokinds of subjectivity
must be eliminated from DSM : (a) the subjectivity of the clinician
making the diagnosis and (b) the subjectivity of the patient being
diagnosed.
The former kind of subjectivity must quite obviously be sacri-
ﬁced on the altar of reliability, by placing the clinician’s theoretical
and etiologic beliefs on hold. In its extreme version, however,
this approach is likely to reduce the diagnostic process to a mere
checking off of symptoms against a list that is far removed from
the person’s life as a whole. As Greenberg (2010) reports on the
basis of his own experience, a psychiatric interview for diagnos-
ing MDD may last about 7 min on average. Up to its fourth
edition, DSM was formulated as a multi-axial system, made up
of ﬁve dimensions on which the patient’s condition was to be
assessed. In addition to the ﬁrst axis assessing symptoms, which
over time became the most important and often the only one
actually used, it was possible to assess, via Axis IV, psychosocial
stressors (e.g., death of a loved one, divorce, losing a job, etc.)
that could affect the diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis of men-
tal disorders; while Axis V was designed to evaluate the patient’s
level of global functioning. This multi-axial approach has been
omitted from DSM-5, in order to harmonize DSM with ICD 10,
that is, the tenth edition of International Classiﬁcation of Disease
(World Health Organisation [WHO], 2010), a system that uses no
axes. Moreover the axial system was considered too complex for
practitioners to manage, with the risk that the diagnosis might
be excessively biased by clinicians’ subjective judgment (Migone,
2013).
However, the most important omission from DSM-5 concerns
the subjectivity of the patient. The negative effects of excluding the
relational context and life events of patients from the diagnostic
process have been emphasized many times in this paper, taking
bereavement as a paradigmatic example in relation to MDD. Like-
wise, our various citations of Frances (2013) and other authors
illustrate how the validity problems of DSM are largely caused by
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its exclusive focus on symptoms, a perspective that overlooks the
peculiar aspects of patients’ subjective experience. In addressing
the question of normativity, we have argued that one of the major
issues for depressive patients is having a meaningful relationship
with the world (Jacobs, 2013). Now, we wish to stress here that the
personal meanings individuals attribute to symptoms and their
possible causes are as important as the symptoms themselves in
diagnosing the kind of disorder patients are suffering from (Kelly,
1955; Neimeyer, 2009; Jacobs, 2013)5. Moreover, personal mean-
ings are deeply embedded in the social, relational, familial context
in which individual patients live: life narratives and discursive and
cultural practices have a profound inﬂuence on many individ-
ual mental processes, both normal and abnormal (Bruner, 1990;
White and Epston, 1991; Stolorow and Atwood, 1992; Neimeyer
and Mahoney, 1995; Stern, 2005; Denborough, 2014). But explor-
ing such meanings requires much more than a symptom-based
checklist. It requires a theory enabling clinicians to establish
“robust” connections between the different aspects of a patient’s
experience. We are suggesting here that explanations in psychiatry
and clinical psychology are at least in part based on generalizations
of a particular kind, regarding both individual and relational pro-
cesses in patients’ histories, the origin of psychopathology, and the
onset of full-blown symptomatology (Guidano, 1987; Neimeyer
and Mahoney, 1995; Neimeyer and Raskin, 2000; Arciero and
Bondolﬁ, 2009; Neimeyer, 2009; Villegas, 2011; Ugazio, 2013).
Such generalizations derive from a particular form of knowledge –
acquired in clinical and psychotherapeutic settings – that concerns
a relatively limited number of individual cases; although this kind
of knowledge clearly bears less statistical weight than that obtain-
able in experimental settings, it has the advantage of being more
in-depth and sophisticated in nature than the analysis of patients’
surface symptoms alone (Ugazio, 2013). The construction of this
kind of generalization requires the adoption of an explicit theo-
retical standpoint enabling the formulation of hypotheses regard-
ing subjective and contextual factors inﬂuencing the onset of
symptoms.
The position just outlined is driven by a “double dissatisfac-
tion.” Our ﬁrst dissatisfaction is with psychological approaches
based on generalizations deﬁned in terms of overly “simple” oper-
ational constructs, which may only be evaluated via checklists
of symptom or in controlled laboratory settings, that is, gen-
eralizations that do not take adequate account of the subjective
and relational factors underlying the origin and manifestation of
psychopathologies (Compas and Gotlib, 2002). But at the same
time, we are also dissatisﬁed with positions denying the possi-
bility that general statements may be formulated from clinical
data, due to their idiosyncratic nature and the “complexity” of the
subject matter (Anderson and Goolishian, 1992; von Glaserfeld,
5According to many psycho(patho)logical theories, in particular those informed by
the constructivist paradigm, the problem of making sense of the self and the world
is the problem of mental life (Bruner, 1991; Hermans, 2003). “A distinctive feature
of constructivist perspectives in psychotherapy is a speciﬁc interest in processes of
meaning construction (Neimeyer and Mahoney, 1995; Raskin and Bridges, 2002;
Neimeyer, 2009). Guidano (1991, p. 56–60) deﬁned psychopathology as a ‘science
of meaning,’ developing the notion that ‘personal meaning organization’ guides
the meaning making process underpinning the development of self, promoting
coherence, and stability in personal identity” (Castiglioni et al., 2014, p. 120).
1995): in the name of the uniqueness of each individual person
and of the self-referential character of knowledge (particularly in
relation to the human sciences), subjectivism and relativism risk
conﬁning clinicians within the narrow boundaries of the single
case, preventing them from making, albeit tentatively, even the
most necessary generalizations in termsof diagnosis and treatment
(Ugazio, 2013).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, through our analysis of the paradigmatic case
of MMD and of the omission of the bereavement exclusion
clause from DSM-5, we have argued that a solely symptom-based
approach is seriously ﬂawed, being based on an unduly restric-
tive view of mental disorders. Not surprisingly, such a view has
justiﬁed a dramatic“medicalization”of normal psychological phe-
nomena (such as mourning), causing increasingly widespread and
indiscriminate use of drug treatments, and provoking strong reac-
tions from some of the initial DSM supporters. From this strongly
reductionist and naturalistic stance, mental disorders – despite
their apparent peculiarity – are seen as essentially biological dis-
eases, just like cancer or diabetes, and must be medically treated
accordingly: in the near future technical tools and knowledge will
be established that will allow us to reduce psychiatric symptoms
to functional and/or chemical alterations in the brain (Andreasen,
2001; White et al., 2012). At the opposite end of the spectrum,
advocates of anti-psychiatry (Szasz, 2001) maintain that mental
disorders do not really exist per se, but rather are the outcome
of the overwhelming pressure of cultural power on the weakest
members of a given social system, a power that everyone is called
to resist.
In more philosophical terms, if we appeal to the customary
distinction (see for instance Moser, 2002) between ontology (con-
cerning what there is in the world) and epistemology (concerning
howwe come to knowwhat there is in theworld), each of the above
approaches tends to suppress one of these two aspects in exclusive
favor of the other6. According to the reductionist and naturalis-
tic approach, psychological and psycho-pathological phenomena
are to be reduced in principle to their neurobiological correlates,
because what exists in a fundamental sense is just the biological
realm, whereas, according to the anti-psychiatric approach, men-
tal disorders are to be reduced to culturally constructed artifacts.
Thus both approaches appear to be ideologically driven and reduc-
tionist, given that they are both likely to prevent, in a theoretical
and empirical sense, the fruitful integration of the neurobiolog-
ical and sociocultural approaches within psychiatry and clinical
psychology.
Are there any viable alternatives? The ﬁrst could be the Bio-
Psycho-Social Model (BPS), proposed by Engel (1977, 1980), that
has been quite widespread as an alternative in psychiatry and in
psychosomatic medicine to the reductionist biological model. BPS
is supposed to be amodel that combines both a philosophy of clin-
ical care and a concrete treatment guide, with particular regard to
the importance of the ‘patient-as-a-person’ in clinical relationship
6For a discussion of the distinction between ontology and epistemology within the
constructivist paradigm to which we refer later, see Hacking (1999), Raskin (2001),
and Castiglioni (2011).
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(Smith, 2002; Borrell-Carrió et al., 2004; Adler, 2009). From a
philosophical perspective the BPS attempts to understand dis-
ease and illnesses by considering the multi-leveled organization
of patients ranging from society to the biological. As a matter of
fact, however, there is a wide debate about the validity and the
consistency of this model.
On one side, it is considered as an important antidote to the
reductionist biological psychiatry in as much as it reafﬁrms the
importance of the psychological and social factors in understand-
ing and treating mental disorders. Not by chance, BPS arose as an
answer to the increase in the use of psychopharmacology linked to
DSM-III (Ghaemi, 2009); so its caveats are still very relevant today
(Adler, 2009, Helmchen, 2013).
But on the other side, it has been noted that“unfortunately, nei-
ther Engel himself nor his successors have ever provided clear-cut
criteria as to how to use BPS characteristics to change the biomedi-
cal research paradigm”(Schubert, 2010, p. 389). According to these
criticism, BPS never represented a real form of integration of the
three levels, due to the fact that the interconnections between them
remain unclear: such a general approach risks viewing the three
levels (biological, psychological, social) as separate, given that their
actual interrelations still require much additional analysis, both
theoretical and empirical.
Bio-Psycho-Social Model’s more severe critics argue that it has
just resulted in a form of vague eclecticism, not only due to the
lack of concrete applications, but also due to the assumptions
of the model itself (Ghaemi, 2009, p. 3). ‘The-more-is-better’
assumption of BPS does not necessarily provide a real advance,
neither in the theoretical nor in the empirical realm: “An empir-
ical defense of the ‘the more is better’ philosophy sometimes is
made based on the eclectic biopsychosocial intuition that medica-
tions and psychotherapy are always, and inherently, more effective
than either alone. Empirically, sometimes this is so, sometimes
not. Using one method or treatment purely often produces better
results or is more valid than using multiple approaches together”
(Ghaemi, 2009, p. 4). From a philosophical perspective, BPS
combines general system theory, psychoanalysis, semiotics, and
constructivism (Adler, 2009; Schubert, 2010) in order to provide
theoretical foundations to all of the three levels. Such a combina-
tion, according to the critics, does not prove to be fully consistent
and robust. Stier (2014), in his commentary onHelmchen’s (2013)
defense of BPS as an advanced, integrative, evidence-based con-
ception of mental illness, argues that “the biopsychosocial model
of mental illness is valuable as a reminder that there is more to
mental illness than brain functions. Seen as theory, it will either
be based on biology and meet similar trouble as the so called biol-
ogism in psychiatry, or else it will indeed be vague and border on
anarchy” (p. 2).
Another more sophisticated alternative is represented by the so
called“third wave of biological psychiatry” (TW). This framework
supports what its proponents see as a growing caution in speci-
fying the complex, multi-faceted nature of mental disorders, and
argues in favor of a “multilevel approach ranging from genes to
psychosocial mechanisms” (Walter, 2013).
First of all, although sensitive to the relevance of neurobiologi-
cal correlation patterns, TW appears to be explicit on the amount
of normativity implicit in any assessment of mental disorders:
“According to the third wave of biological psychiatry, mental
disorders are relatively stable prototypical, dysfunctional neural
systems at various levels. As with any understanding of disease
in general the notion of a ‘dysfunction’ inevitably involves norma-
tive judgments of what is regarded as normal, functional, healthy
on the one hand, and as abnormal, dysfunctional, pathological on
the other hand” (Walter, 2013, p. 2). Moreover, TW supports an
approach tomental disorder inwhich sub-structures ranging from
the biological to the socio-cultural level are seen as mutually inter-
acting and linked by truly causal relationships. In order to provide
a satisfactory explanation of mental disorders, a multilevel and
multidimensional structure is postulated. All these levels are held
to form what are called ‘mechanistic property clusters’ (MPC),
with a terminology derived from a proposal originally presented
by Kendler et al. (2011) and inspired by the application of the
MPC concept to describe biological species (Boyd, 1991, 1999).
In the latter case, morphological, physiological, and behavioral
features appear to co-operate in order to characterize a species,
although not all members need overlap in some single set of
traits; “rather, members are clustered near one another in a feature
space because of developmental, evolutionary, and physiological
causalmechanisms and constraints”(Kendler et al., 2011, p. 1146).
Kendler et al. (2011) support the extension to psychiatry of a sim-
ilar approach: in this vein, we might conjecture the existence of a
similar, complex and intertwined structure accounting for mental
disorders, in which mechanisms ranging across the levels, albeit
in a truly causal sense, can be conceived (although with a robust
degree of idealization). Such kind of conjecture is also consistent
with the claim that “etiological models for psychiatric disorders
need to be pluralistic” (Kendler, 2008, p. 695; see also Kendler,
2005).
A ﬁnal move of TW – a move that we prefer to remain neutral
about – is to strengthen the link between psychiatry and phi-
losophy of mind, on the basis of the claim according to which
“if we better understand how mental states are related to brain
states we might better understand how disordered mental states
relate to disordered brain states” (Walter, 2013, p. 6). Our neutral
stance on this option is motivated by what we see as a twofold
risk. First, claims like the above seem to assume that mind–brain
relation is a much easier issue than it really is: the ‘hardness’ of
such an issue is often characterized as the circumstance that not
only we do not know whether there is a solution to the mind–
brain problem, but we are not even clear on what a ‘solution’
should look like. Second, even if we suppose that the mind–
brain problem is not as hard as one might think, the sort of
assumptions and style of reasoning typical of the philosophy of
mind debates are likely to increase controversy that, far from
positively contributing, might even make problems harder than
they are.
Of course, like BPS, Walter’s TW is not exempt from criticism.
Pawelzik (2013), although he recognizes the value of Walter’s pro-
posal, points out some problems in the new wave of biological
psychiatry. Firstly, being essentially “biological” and grounded in
the methodology of neuroscience, it leads to a misguided vision
of the mental realm, in which subjective consciousness is under-
estimated. Secondly, TW suffers from individualism: “mental
functions –our ability to feel, to think, to act- are collectively
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deﬁned, socio-cultural artifacts rather than purely natural, indi-
vidual dispositions.” Therefore Pawelzik considers the “third wave
as an individualistically limited enterprise” (p. 1). Thirdly, the
brainplasticity, i.e., the possibility that experience –withparticular
regard to social experience deriving from attachment relationships-
changes brain functioning is diminished: “If the mind that super-
venes on brain states can actively change brain states, thereby
redirecting the brain’s development depending on various envi-
ronmental contingencies—than this ‘enactive mind’ is obviously
underspeciﬁed by the third wave concepts Walter offers.” (. . .)
“To sum up: Walter’s description of third wave biological psychi-
atry is on the right track: we should embrace his purgation of a
lot of biologistic thought. Still (...), Walter left the main concep-
tual pillars of biological psychiatry—‘mindlessness’ and ‘medical
model’—basically untouched (p. 2).”
If we turn back to DSM, it may well represent a useful tool
among many others, and is therefore not to be considered (as
is often the case) “the Bible of psychiatry” (Maj, 2014). It must
be acknowledged that, in the section on “use of the manual,”
the editors of DSM-5 themselves warn about the risks of taking
its symptomatic categories as the only criteria on which a diag-
nosis can be based. Symptom-based criteria may complement
but cannot substitute reconstruction of patient’s clinical story
and analysis of the social, psychological, and biological factors
that may have inﬂuenced the onset of a disorder. In any case,
checklists of symptom cannot convey the meaningfulness inher-
ent in the clinical relationship with individual patients and the
vivid knowledge to be obtained from “ﬁrst-person” narratives of
personal suffering (Frances, 2013; Jacobs, 2013). Furthermore,
the provisional deﬁnition of mental disorders, formulated in
the same section of DSM-5, speciﬁes that pain caused by psy-
chosocial stressors, especially the loss of a loved one, cannot
be per se classiﬁed as a mental disorder: a claim that, as we
have argued, can hardly be consistent with the omission of the
bereavement exclusion clause and with the new deﬁnition of
MDD7.
Apart from these criticisms, we acknowledge the useful role
of DSM system: it provides some criteria as to whether and how
people should be diagnosed and treated when they are unwell.
We already stressed the prominent role played by DSM system
in reaching reliability in the psychiatric ﬁeld, a huge problem
that today – from a general perspective – can be considered as
resolved. Moreover, if it is true that DSM might invite a pathol-
ogization of normal experience, as a counterpart it might also
be seen as promoting a “normalization” of pathological experi-
ence, therebyﬁghting some formsof stigma associatedwithmental
problems.
In any case, our criticism is directed toward a speciﬁc disorder
(MDD) in DSM-5 and not toward DSM as a whole. The problem
is not replacing the DSM system completely, but rather integrating
it with other perspectives and tools (where applicable) not only on
the“concrete”level of clinical practice (where the above integration
is often adopted, e.g., in the so called “integrated approaches” that
rely both on pharmaceutical treatment and psychotherapy), but
also on a more general and theoretical level. It must be admitted
7For an alternative perspective on grief and bereavement, see Neimeyer et al. (2011).
that the overall consistency of such an integration in the current
state of knowledge might result far from completely settled.
Moreover, a revision of the reductionist approach should con-
sider the thorny problem of its feasibility. Ideally, one solution
might be to create a multidisciplinary “ecumenical scientiﬁc man-
ual,” in which all (or the major part of the) different perspectives
and professional roles (i.e., psychiatrists, clinical psychologists,
counselors, developmental/educational psychologists, family ther-
apists, psychoanalysts, cognitive-behavioral therapists etc.) could
be represented, discussed, and evaluated with regards to different
mental disorders. Unfortunately, due to the presence of so many
various points of view, there are limits to this kind of solution.
The main ones are the risk of a reliability loss and the risk of high
internal inconsistency: despite pointing at an integrated approach,
such an attempt might result in a-systematic compilation of per-
spectives so distant that would be difﬁcult to combine to create a
worthwhile product8.
To some extent, it is a controversy that probably will never be
resolved. Due to the fact that (at least in our opinion) the real prob-
lem is not to forcedly integrate opposingperspectives, but to clearly
understand the assumptions entailed by a determined perspective
and its domain of application -in Kelly’s (1955) words “the range
of convenience” of a construct/theory-, perhaps it would be better
if DSM, instead of declaring itself a-theoretical, could explicitly
declare its theoretical position.
To sum up, we advocate what might be called a “moderate con-
structivist” meta-theoretical position. According to this position,
it seems reasonable to view all diagnostic and clinical categories as
provisional scientiﬁc constructs that can usefully guide both treat-
ment and research, and to accept that the “normal–abnormal”
continuum contains a structurally normative element (Pignarre,
2001; Frances, 2013; Stier, 2013). Thus, although it is possible to
distinguish – in line with certain socially and culturally deﬁned
and theoretically informed scientiﬁc standards – the individuals
that may be placed at each of the two extremes of the contin-
uum, it turns out to be harder to position those falling in the
middle.
As a concluding remark, we would like to stress that our argu-
ment here is meant to be founded not only on an enquiry into the
empirical and theoretical structure of speciﬁcpsychological and/or
psychiatric theories, but above all also on a foundational andphilo-
sophical analysis reminiscent of a truly “humanistic approach”
to the human sciences (Williams, 1991). It is our deep convic-
tion that such an approach may contribute to paving the way for
a more fruitful integration of neurobiological factors with cul-
tural, social, familial, and personal meanings and values, toward
achieving a richer and more valuable characterization of “human
nature.”
8Another thorny issue should be considered. As we mentioned in paragraph 3, the
“circularity” of deﬁnitions of clinical and research levels with relation to depressive
disordersmust be avoided.With regards to the double role that DSMplays in clinical
and research ﬁelds, we see two possible solutions: (1) DSM could play both roles, if
the different general assumptions underlying the two roles are clearly speciﬁed; (2) the
two roles could be separated, while at the same time integrated in order to provide
reciprocal feed-back between clinical practice and research. But the solution is to
be found case by case. It is not surprising that DSM manual is usually supported
by clinical casebooks that present real “prototypical” life histories to exemplify the
various mental disorders (see for instance Spitzer et al., 2006; Barnhill, 2014).
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